The Madrid Middle East peace conference launched 30 years ago is a model that should inspire President Biden as he searches for a post-Trump policy for the region
On 30 October 1991, President George H Bush delivered the first substantive speech at the Madrid Middle East conference.
He was followed by the last leader of the Soviet Union Mikhail Gorbachev. Subsequent speakers included Israeli’s Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir and Syrian Foreign Minister Farouk a-Shara.
Never before had all the key players in the Arab-Israel conflict gathered together outside the UN. It was a moment of hope that has never been matched.
What made the conference possible was the international response to Iraq’s seizure of Kuwait in August 1991. Bush forged a coalition to restore Kuwait’s sovereignty that included most Arab states and enjoyed Moscow’s support.
Its success was declared to be the start of a New World Order in which the Cold War rivalry that had dominated global politics for 45 years was redundant. At its final session on 1 November, US Secretary of State James Baker said the Madrid conference was only a start.
“You now shoulder the destiny and challenge of making peace, as you enter direct negotiations with your neighbors,” he said. “The continuation and success of this process is in your hands.”
… The five factors that sank Madrid…
Thirty years on and it seems those burdened with the responsibility for delivering on Madrid’s promise largely failed. And yet it could — a certainly should — be the inspiration for any new Middle East peace initiative President Biden may eventually launch.
Why didn’t Madrid succeed? There are five big reasons:
- It was too ambitious, aiming to deliver simultaneously a settlement of all outstanding issues between Israel on the one hand and Jordan, Lebanon, Syria and the Palestinians including competing claims for Jerusalem on the other. But key Arab states including Saudi Arabia would have refused to endorse anything other than multilateral talks addressing everything at the same time. So if Madrid was intrinsically flawed, it was for good reasons.
- Bush’s defeat in November 1992 at the hands of Bill Clinton. Clinton’s campaign included complaints that the Madrid conference was unfair to Israel. His victory represented the death knell for multilateralism Madrid expressed. Clinton’s administration working outside the Madrid framework blessed the first Oslo accord, a bilateral deal between Israel and the PLO reached in August 1993. The PLO had been excluded from any direct role in the Madrid process where the Palestinians were represented by people living in Gaza and the West Bank. The first Oslo accord was signed in Washington by PLO chairman Yasser Arafat and Israel’s Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin in September 1993. The Oslo accords are now widely seen as been a dead-end. The PLO’s decision to initiate bilateral talks had enormous consequences. Jordan — which has a population that is mainly of Palestinian descent — rushed to reach its own bilateral deal in 1994. Arab states, notably Saudi Arabia, were infuriated that Arafat had broken ranks. Many Palestinians were shocked and those involved in the Madrid talks felt marginalised.
- The collapse of the Soviet Union which was formally dissolved at the end of December 1991 following an unsuccessful military coup against Gorbachev in August. Gorbachev resigned, removing a key figure behind the Madrid process. Internal divisions and an economic collapse preoccupied Russia’s new leaders for more than a decade.
- The assassination of Israel’s Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin on 4 November 1995. Rabin’s reputation as a military hero and political strong man was critical to securing Israeli support for a deal with the Palestinians. His successor Shimon Peres failed to fill his shoes and in an attempt to demonstrate his resolution ordered an assault on south Lebanon in April 1996. Despite that, he was defeated by Benjamin Netanyahu in the election to be Israel’s prime minister later that year. Netanyahu ruled out the possibility of a Palestinian state, the promise of which was essential if the Palestinians and their regional allies were to remain engaged.
- Events. With Israel’s interest fading, Clinton invested more time in the Oslo process but his energies were diverted in 1998 by the Monica Lewinsky scandal and impeachment. Politically weakened, Clinton’s final attempt to broker a final agreement between Israel and the PLO launched in the summer of 2000 was a failure. In September, the second Palestinian Intifada began. George W Bush was inaugurated the following January and showed little interest in the Arab-Israel conflict. But under pressure from Saudi Arabia, he was about to sanction a new initiative when the 9/11 attacks on the US happened. His response was to approve the invasion and occupation of Afghanistan and Iraq. Both measures were deeply unpopular in the Arab and Islamic world while Israel, in contrast, was an enthusiastic supporter. Bush became the first US president to support the idea of a Palestinian state but the deteriorating conditions in Afghanistan and Iraq were a persistent distraction. His successor Barack Obama entered the White House amid hopes of a fresh start but his efforts produced few results.
Joe Biden, Obama’s vice president, has promised comprehensive change in US foreign policy including in the Middle East. But he says he wants to build on last year’s Abraham Accords which normalised relations with some Arab states including Morocco and the UAE. Some believe the accords have created the best conditions for a multilateral breakthrough since 1991 but that won’t happen unless they are broadened out to encompass the key elements that made Madrid possible. These include Palestinian engagement and full participation by influential Arab states, notably Saudi Arabia.
…Do the key players actually want to change the status quo?…
The US would be centrally involved. Israel reassured by the Abraham accords should be content to sit down with countries with which it has — or wants — diplomatic relations. The Palestinians will be under pressure to attend. So it’s all possible.
There are obstacles. The first is that Biden’s administration will fail to rise to the challenge He’s already defined China and Russia as his foreign policy preoccupations. The Middle East is declining as a US priority. And Biden’s relations with Saudi Arabia are cool.
The second resides in the divisions among Palestinians. Hoping to curry favour in Washington, PNA president Mahmoud Abbas has called overdue parliamentary and presidential elections for the spring and summer. This looks like an opportunity for Palestinian leaders to renew their mandate and present a unified front. But the reality is that Hamas will continue to dominate Gaza while Fatah will retain its position as the most important political factor in the West Bank. Representatives of Palestinian refugees living outside Gaza and the West Bank are being ignored. The danger is voting will change nothing.
But apparently insuperable problems beset plans for Madrid, and yet it went ahead because the circumstances created by the events of 1991 made it necessary.
So the big question is this: do the US, Israel, influential Arab states and the Palestinians actually want to change a status quo? Or are they content to let it continue until the type of disaster that begat the Madrid conference happens again?